Property owner failed to allege Ch. 211 or 245 claims for zoning change; failure-to-exhaust-remedies bar applied to inverse-condemnation claim
City of Dickinson v Stefan, 14-18-00778-CV, (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dis.], Oct. 27, 2020)
Stefan operated his home computer business in a residential zone, but allowed his church group to host events, including weddings on the property. The City changed later changed the zoning code and created a registration process for non-conforming uses. The registration allows a property owner to continue the same nonconforming use after the City adopted the change but the owner cannot expand the nonconforming use. Stefan registered his home computer business but did not list any church activities. Stefan did not write “events,” “wedding venue,” “event center,” or anything else that would indicate he had been using the Property for events. Neither party produced evidence the City approved the request. Stefan was later cited for operating a special event center against the zoning code without a special use permit. Stefan appealed to the Board of Appeals, which denied his request to operate special events. Stefan then sued the City for declaratory relief claimed inverse-condemnation. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which was denied. The City appealed.
The Court first held that Stefan failed to allege a vested right determination under chapter 245 or a board of adjustment appeal under chapter 211 of the Texas Local Government Code. The operation of an ongoing business is not a “project” within the meaning of chapter 245. Rights to which a permit applicant is entitled under chapter 245 accrue on the filing of an original application or plan for development or plat application that gives the regulatory agency fair notice of the project and the nature of the permit sought. Stefan’s pleadings do not mention chapter 245 or a vested right. Stefan does not cite § 211.011 or seek a writ of certiorari for a BOA appeal. He sued the City, not the BOA. As a result, he failed to seek judicial review of the BOA decision. The City challenged jurisdiction for the declaratory judgment and takings claims for failure to timely appeal the City Board of Adjustment determination and that Stefan did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding nonconforming uses. Even under a liberal construction of the pleadings, the court cannot create a claim Stefan’s pleading did not contain, and it could not conclude that Stefan sought judicial review of the BOA decision under chapter 211. The exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies rule requires that a plaintiff pursue all available remedies within the administrative process before seeking judicial relief. Chapter 211 must be exhausted before a party may seek judicial review of a determination made by an administrative official. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his declaratory claims and inverse-condemnation claims.
The concurrence believed Stefan’s failure to allege 211 should not preclude consideration, but then held Stefan abandoned that consideration in his briefing.