In re Philip T. Pixler, 02-18-00181-CV (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, July 26, 2018).
This is a mandamus suit where the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the district court had jurisdiction over the City of Newark’s enforcement of its junk vehicle ordinance, but that the City ordinance did not properly create an alternative mechanism to allow for administrative penalties.
Pixler owns an auto-tech business and would sometimes store vehicles in parking spaces and on the neighboring property. Pixler was given eight complaints which were submitted to an administrative board under the City’s ordinances. The board determined the vehicles were junk vehicles and assessed $8,000 in administrative penalties. Pixler did not challenge the board decision directly. The City then filed a petition in district court seeking (1) to enjoin Pixler from further violating its ordinances, (2) to collect the $8,000 in administrative penalties, and (3) to impose separate civil penalties against Pixler for continuing to violate its ordinances. The City won a partial summary judgment motion and awarded penalties totaling $80,000.00, but since the City’s Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act claim is still pending, no final judgment has been entered. Pixler filed this mandamus proceeding challenging the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.
The court divided the holding into roughly three parts: district court jurisdiction over junk-vehicle determinations, district court jurisdiction over administrative penalties assessed by the administrative board, and the district court’s jurisdiction over the additional civil penalties. Subchapter B of chapter 54 of the Texas Local Government Code addresses health and safety ordinances and allows a district court to have jurisdiction over enforcement of such ordinances. And §54.016 permits the municipality to obtain injunctive relief against the owner of the premises that is allegedly in violation of the ordinance. Since the City ordinance declares any junked vehicle visible from a public place to be detrimental to the safety and welfare of the public, enforcement is properly in the district court. And since §54.017 allows civil penalties of no more than $1,000 per day, the district court has jurisdiction over the civil penalties. However, for administrative penalties assessed by the administrative board, the City’s ordinances did not comply with the statutory requirements. The City’s ordinances adopt the procedures established under the Texas Transportation Code chapter 683 for abatement of junked vehicles. But, the procedures adopted address enforcement in municipal court before a judge. And while Subchapter E of Chapter 683 allows a city to adopt an alternative procedure for junked vehicles and §54.044 of the Local Government Code likewise allows a city to adopt a general alternative procedure, none of the City’s ordinances actually did that. The court acknowledged the City has the statutory authority to adopt an alternative administrative procedure, but to do so, the City must adopt a specific ordinance setting out the process. Simply because the City has a municipal court of record, does not, by default, mean it can utilize an alternative administrative procedure. Because the City utilized that procedure when its ordinances did not adopt one, the administrative board lacked authority to assess the $8,000 administrative penalty.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Sudderth, Justice Walker and Justice Meier. Opinion by Justice Meier. Attorneys listed for the City real parties in interest are William Andrew Messer and William W. Krueger, III. Pixler appeared pro se.