Dallas Court of Appeals holds commercial lease on property separated from airport was a proprietary function
City of Dallas v. Oxley Leasing North Loop, LLC, 05-21-00241-CV, (Tex. App – Dallas, Nov. 12, 2021)
This is a breach of a lease agreement case where the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, holding the City was performing a proprietary function.
The City created a Land Use and Development Plan (“Development Plan”) for the airport. The Development Plan identified several portions of airport property for potential development, designating some as airfield operations, airfield-related development, non-aviation-related development, open space/recreational, and a commercial office park. The City leased portions of the commercial office park (“the Property”) to First Continental Bank for an initial term of 40 years. The City agreed to construct a barrier and a road to physically separate the Property from the back of the airport. The lease was assigned several times, eventually being held by Oxley. The City and Oxley dispute whether Oxley property initiated an extension under the lease. The City, believing no renewal had occurred, moved to evict Oxley. Oxley filed suit for breach of the lease and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea and the City appealed.
Leasing in a commercial park is not listed under the TTCA as a governmental function. As a result, the court must analyze the nature of the transaction under Wasson II standards. The mere fact that the City leased property located at the airport is not determinative of the nature of that activity. Since the Property is identified by the City as nonaviation related, the court had little difficulty determining it was not related to the operation of the airport. Under Wasson II, the City had no obligation to lease the Property to First Continental Bank, was discretionary, and the nature of the private lease necessarily excludes the general public from benefiting from the premises. The fact that a city’s proprietary action bears some metaphysical relation to a governmental function is insufficient to render the proprietary action governmental. As a result, the specific lease at issue is proprietary and the City is not entitled to immunity.
Panel consists of Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia. Affirmed. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Schenck can be read here. Docket page with attorney information found here.
