THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS M.D. ANDERSON CANCER CENTER v. LANCE MCKENZIE, 17-0730 (June 28, 2019)
This is a Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA)/tangible personal property case in which the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the district’s plea to the jurisdiction for its use of a carrier agent during surgery.
Cortney McKenzie-True began treatment for cancer at M.D. Anderson. She went through a test trial for treatment. The visible cancer was first surgically removed. After a chemo drug was administered, the body was washed out with a carrier agent. The hospital used D5W. Use of the carrier agent had an adverse effect on McKenzie-True, which was a known risk but was considered to have a small probability of occurring. McKenzie-True died, and the (McKenzie) family sued. The hospital filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the carrier agent was properly administered, so no negligent use of the drug had occurred. The lower courts denied the plea, and the hospital appealed.
The hospital asserts the McKenzies’ actual claims complain of negligent use of medical judgment, not negligent use of the carrier agent. The McKenzies asserted it was the agent that caused the death, and the hospital should have known it was the incorrect fluid to use. This case blurs the fine line between medical judgment and the negligent implementation of that judgment. The Court held that “[w]hile we agree that a complaint about medical judgment, without more, is insufficient to waive immunity, the negligence alleged here does not involve only medical judgment.” The issue becomes whether the injury is caused by improper medical judgment in which tangible property is used or whether the use, itself, of the property caused the injury, and the fact the property was administered properly is irrelevant. The Plaintiffs alleged D5W never should have been used, due to the high levels needed for the test trial procedure. The fact that the use was preceded by medical judgment is of no consequence, since all aspects of surgery are preceded by medical judgment. From a pleading standpoint, this is sufficient to establish jurisdiction and a potential waiver.
Additionally, the Court held this was the analysis of immunity from suit, not immunity from liability. Essentially, the Court held the plea allegations are based not only on medical judgment, but on a direct causal connection of the use of personal property.
The dissent asserts that a separation of the decision (medical judgment) from the use of property is important. The majority’s interpretation eliminates sovereign immunity regarding medical judgment. Noting, “If sugar water [D5W] should not have been used, neither should a scalpel have been, or the surgical apparatus, or for that matter, the building.” The dissent asserted the medical judgment should not be disregarded and that if it was based on medical judgment, there is no waiver.
If you would like to read this opinion, click here: opinion of the Court. Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion in which Justices Guzman, Boyd, Devine, and Blacklock joined. Chief Justice Hecht delivered a dissenting opinion, with Justice Green and Justice Brown joining.